

#### AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

On April 28 Pischevari, heading a six-man delegation, arrived in Teheran for negotiations. A fortnight in the capital brought no results. Pischevari insisted on three points unacceptable to Qavam. These were (a) the right of the Azerbaijan government to appoint a governor for the province; (b) the distribution of state-owned land to the peasants; and (3) the appointment of commanders of the Azerbaijan army and gendarmerie by the Azerbaijan government.

On May 15 Pischevari returned to Tabriz, and in a broadcast through the local radio warned the central government that any attempt by Iranian forces to invade Azerbaijan would constitute a breach of the agreement with the Soviet Union. This statement seemed to imply that Pischevari was on the defensive. This was undoubtedly so, because on May 9, during his stay in Teheran, the Red Army had evacuated the territory of Iran. At Lake Success, New York, where the Security Council was wrangling about the legal aspects of the evacuation, the news was greeted with joy, for it indicated that the United Nations was able to settle a problem "leading to international friction." This rejoicing was premature. The Soviets did evacuate their forces, but only after having obtained an oil concession and having left behind a revolutionary Communist regime in Azerbaijan apt to act as a powerful lever of pressure on Iran. With these two factors the Security Council was unwilling to deal. It only paid lip service to international morality by retaining the matter on its agenda despite Soviet protests at the final session devoted to Iran.

The break in negotiations with Azerbaijan leaders in Teheran was

not final. Both sides had good reasons for desiring a settlement. On May 17 talks with Pishevari were reopened, this time at Tabriz. The Iranian mission was headed by Mozaffar Firuz, Director of Propaganda under Qavam, who throughout the whole crisis maintained a decidedly pro-Soviet attitude." On June 14 a ten-point agreement was finally concluded. Its provisions were:

i\* While Ambassador Ala courageously defended the cause of Iran before the Security Council, Fimz, at press conferences in Teheran, frequently contradicted Ala's statements and publicly disavowed him. On certain occasions he went so far as to make statements opposed to the wishes of his chief Qavam. Acting as Qavani's interpreter at some conferences, he distorted the Premier's statements and thus provoked complaints from foreign correspondents. This eventually led